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 11  Deleuze and the Pragmatist Priority 
of Subject Naturalism 
 Simon B. Duffy 
 Rather than making grand claims about the relation between Deleuze’s 
approach to philosophy and pragmatism, what I attempt to do in this chapter 
is position Deleuze’s work in relation to some of the more interesting recent 
developments in pragmatism, specifi cally a certain pragmatist approach to 
philosophy put forward by David Macarthur and Huw Price (2007), which 
they refer to as subject naturalism. In many respects there is much in common 
between various fl avors of pragmatism and Deleuze’s philosophy. In some 
respects, however, drawing connections between the two is not so straight-
forward. What I undertake to do in this chapter is canvass the more obvious 
connections between the two, such as anti-, or nonrepresentationalism—
what some pragmatists refer to as quietism on representation—and then 
try to test the waters with some of those aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy 
that are more diffi cult to forge connections with pragmatism, such as the 
question of Deleuze’s relation to metaphysics. For instance, Macarthur and 
Price’s pragmatism is quietist on metaphysics, whereas Deleuze does seem to 
have metaphysical commitments of one kind or another, at least in terms of 
the metaphysics of the calculus that I argue underpins his ontological com-
mitments. The aim of this chapter is therefore to test the degree to which 
Deleuze’s philosophy can be reconciled with the subject naturalist approach 
to pragmatism put forward by Macarthur and Price. 
 Pragmatists have traditionally been critical of representationalism 
but supportive of a kind of naturalism, understood as naturalism about 
human subjects. In “Naturalism Without Mirrors,” Huw Price distinguishes 
between two kinds of naturalism. On the one hand there is the familiar 
“object naturalism,” or what he refers to as “capital N Naturalism,” which 
is the view that the only facts there are are the kinds of facts recognized 
by natural science. The world is the world-as-studied-by-science; whatever 
exists does so “in the natural realm.” On the other hand, there is the less 
familiar “subject naturalism,” which is the philosophical viewpoint that 
begins with the realization that humans are natural creatures and that 
human thought and discursive practice are part of the world, or part of the 
natural order. While capital N Naturalists consider subject naturalism to be 
merely a subspecies of object naturalism, Price claims, on the contrary, that 
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subject naturalism is importantly prior to object naturalism. This claim to 
priority is in response to the fact that object naturalism presupposes  a par-
ticular “representational” or “referential” view of human linguistic activity, 
namely the representational or referential relation between language and the 
natural world. And that this view about human language is a presupposition 
that is properly assessed from a subject naturalist standpoint. 
 While Price is primarily concerned with better addressing the concerns 
about time and causation that object naturalism engages with, this distinc-
tion is informative for assessing and understanding some of the moves that 
are made by Deleuze in the development of his philosophy of difference. 
Similarly to the pragmatism outlined above, Deleuze is also critical of rep-
resentationalism, and his work is concerned with recent developments in 
mathematics and science; indeed his work is replete with mathematical 
examples, which begs the question of the relation Deleuze’s philosophy 
has to pragmatism and to the kinds of naturalism supported by its various 
adherents. It is clear from a number of statements that Deleuze makes 
throughout his work that he is critical of the scientifi c reductionism that 
goes hand in hand with what I’ll refer to, following Price, as “capital N 
Naturalism.” However, it is less clear whether a kind of subject naturalism 
can be understood to be operative in his work. Deleuze’s obvious favor of 
the Spinozist doctrine that we humans are not “a kingdom within a king-
dom” (Spinoza 2002, EIIIPref; PT, chapter 2.6) but rather are a part of 
nature does provide some support for such a reading. However, the meta-
physics that is more or less explicit in the philosophy of difference that 
Deleuze develops throughout his work, and the range of Romantic char-
acterizations of it that have been developed by his commentators, is less 
obviously reconcilable with the pragmatist subject naturalism proposed 
by Price. 
 What I claim in this chapter is that Deleuze’s metaphysics, and the onto-
logical commitments it seems to imply, can be understood in a defl ationary 
way to be a metaphysics of the calculus, namely, the logic of the calculus of 
problems, that draws upon a conception of mathematics that is more than 
just the sum of its theories, and that this defl ationary metaphysics is con-
sonant in useful ways with the subject naturalism proposed by Price. One 
preliminary consonance being that the conception of mathematics that 
Deleuze develops does not serve the same reductive ends that “capital N 
Naturalism” requires, but rather it serves as a useful tool for modeling the 
nature of our relation to the world without the representational presuppo-
sitions of the latter. This conception of mathematics draws upon the work 
of Henri Poincaré, Bernhard Riemann, Hermann Weyl, and the mathemat-
ical philosophy of Albert Lautman (Lautman 2011). The metaphysics of 
the calculus that Deleuze develops therefore moves beyond the scientifi c 
reductionism of a thoroughgoing “capital N Naturalism” and provides a 
defl ationary model for the metaphysical claims that Deleuze makes about 
the virtual. 1 
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 LEITER AND SPECULATIVE M-NATURALISM 
 In order to better position Deleuze’s philosophy in relation to what I’ll refer 
to as Price’s subject naturalist pragmatism, I’d fi rst like to make some pre-
liminary comments about Deleuze’s relation to naturalism. In order to do 
so, I want to draw upon the work of the Nietzsche scholar, Brian Leiter, 
who characterizes a particular kind of Humean naturalism, which he refers 
to as speculative, in order to frame a naturalist reading of Nietzsche. What 
I propose to do is to put Deleuze’s philosophy to the test to see whether it 
can be understood to be operating within the parameters of this approach, 
i.e., whether or not it provides the requisite minimalist naturalist frame-
work that Leiter claims is operative in Nietzsche. There are going to be 
some obvious limitations to this exercise. However, this detour helps me 
to set out what I think is an important and often overlooked aspect of 
Deleuze’s philosophy. Far from settling on a speculative approach to char-
acterize Deleuze’s relation to naturalism, I’d like to use this as a platform 
for further interrogating whether Deleuze’s philosophy is reconcilable with 
Price’s pragmatism and the subject naturalism that it endorses. Because this 
is more of a position paper, I am neither going to critique Leiter’s Nietzsche, 
nor propose or defend a reading of Deleuze’s Nietzsche in this chapter. The 
relative success of the argument I’m trying to put together in this chapter 
will rest on the degree to which I am able to argue for the reconciliation of 
Deleuze’s philosophy with Price’s particular brand of pragmatism, rather 
than with Leiter’s minimalist naturalist framework. 
 The benefi ts of this kind of approach, and the reason that I am attempting 
to reconcile Deleuze’s philosophy with such a pragmatist framework is that 
I am interested in putting together a leaner Deleuze, that is, a Deleuze that is 
a bit more “sober and . . . mundane” (Lefebvre 2008, xiv), but hopefully a 
bit more useful; a Deleuze that resists the romance of being historicized as, 
for example, either Kantian or Hegelian, but rather a Deleuze that is able to 
provide the tools to do philosophy today and that is robust enough to have 
those tools deployed widely and usefully. Price offers one of the most inter-
esting contemporary takes on the potential of pragmatism for philosophy 
today, and it is therefore useful to try to determine whether or not Deleuze’s 
philosophy stands up in relation to it, and therefore to determine whether, 
to what degree or in what way, this variety of pragmatism can be used to 
extend Deleuze’s philosophical project. 
 In  Nietzsche on Morality (2002), Leiter sets out a systematic reading 
of Nietzsche as a philosophical naturalist in what he elsewhere calls the 
“broad sense” (Leiter 2013, 576). This is in distinction to what he refers to 
as “Laundry List Naturalism” (Leiter 2013, 577), which bundles together 
all of the following characteristics about Nietzsche: 
 He opposes transcendent metaphysics, whether that of Plato or Chris-
tianity or Schopenhauer. He rejects notions of the immaterial soul, the 
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absolutely free controlling will, or the self-transparent pure intellect, 
instead emphasizing the body, talking of the animal nature of human 
beings, and attempting to explain numerous phenomena by invoking 
drives, instincts, and affects which he locates in our physical, bodily 
existence. Human beings are to be “translated back into nature,” since 
otherwise we falsify their history, their psychology, and the nature of 
their values—concerning all of which we must know truths, as a means 
to the all-important revaluation of values. (Janaway 2007, 34) 
 This is Nietzsche’s naturalism in the broader laundry list sense that Leiter 
considers to be too general. 
 The more specifi c kind of naturalism that Leiter has in mind is “Meth-
odological Naturalism” (which he refers to as “M-Naturalism”), according 
to which “philosophical inquiry . . . should be continuous with empirical 
inquiry in the sciences” (Leiter 2002, 3). The distinction in M-Naturalism 
that Leiter draws upon to characterize Nietzsche’s naturalism is between, on 
the one hand, those M-Naturalists that 
 want to  replace conceptual and justifi catory theories with empirical and 
descriptive theories—for this they draw upon more-or-less Quinean 
arguments against conceptual analysis and foundationalist programs. 
And, on the other hand, those M-Naturalists who retain the  normative 
and regulative ambitions of traditional philosophy, but emphasize that 
it is an  empirical question what normative advice is actually useable and 
effective for creatures like us. (Leiter 2012, 1) 
 It is the latter defi nition that Leiter wants to work with, and he qualifi es 
this position in reference to Hume, whom he characterizes as a speculative 
M-Naturalist. Leiter argues that a Speculative M-Naturalist is a philoso-
pher, like Hume, who wants to “construct theories that are ‘modeled’ on 
the sciences . . . in that they take over from science the idea that natural phe-
nomena have deterministic causes” (Leiter 2002, 5). The important qualifi er 
here is that speculative M-Naturalists 
 do not . . . appeal to  actual causal mechanisms that have been well-
confi rmed by the sciences, because if they did, they would not need to 
 speculate ! Rather, the idea is that their speculative theories of human 
nature are informed by the sciences and a scientifi c picture of how 
things work. (Leiter 2013, 577) 
 Leiter argues that “Hume models his theory of human nature on Newto-
nian science by trying to identify a few basic, general principles that will 
provide a broadly deterministic explanation of human phenomena, much as 
Newtonian mechanics did for physical phenomena”(Leiter 2013, 577). The 
difference is that the Humean theory remains speculative because its claims 
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about human nature are not confi rmed scientifi cally, nor are they supported 
by any of the scientifi c developments of Hume’s day. Leiter goes on to argue 
that 
 Nietzsche, like Hume, has a sustained interest in explaining why 
“human beings act, think, perceive and feel” as they do, especially in 
the broadly ethical domain. Like Hume, Nietzsche proffers a specu-
lative psychology. . . . And this speculative psychology (as well as the 
occasional physiological explanations he offers in passing) appear to 
give us causal explanations for various human phenomena, which, even 
if not law-governed, seem to have a deterministic character (cf. Leiter 
2002, 5). (Leiter 2013, 578) 
 For the purposes of this paper, I am putting aside questioning the details of 
Leiter’s interpretation of Nietzsche, which for all intents and purposes is an 
interesting and compelling attempt to make Nietzsche useful to contempo-
rary readers, albeit readers with a particular interest in moral psychology. 
What I am interested in signaling here, however, is the modeling relation 
that is operative in the speculative M-Naturalist approach. For Hume, it 
is Newtonian mechanics. For Nietzsche, it is the mechanics of psychology. 
What I’d like to argue here is that, for Deleuze, the model is mathematical, 
and it is a mathematical model of the logic of the calculus of problems. 
 THE MATHEMATICAL REAL AND HOW MATHEMATICS 
SERVES AS A MODEL FOR OTHER DISCOURSES 
 Deleuze gives the logic of the calculus of problems an informal mathematical 
characterization by tracing its development through an alternative lineage 
in the history of mathematics from Cauchy through Weierstrassian analytic 
continuity, to Poincaré’s qualitative theory of differential equations, to Rie-
mann’s concept of qualitative multiplicity, or Riemann space. The work of 
Weyl on Riemann surfaces (Weyl 1913) is also instrumental to the develop-
ment of the mathematical model that Deleuze develops. Weyl makes Rie-
mann’s intuitive representation of Riemann space more explicit by using a 
generalization of Weierstrass’s analytic continuity—effectively demonstrat-
ing that Riemann surfaces are the surfaces of Weierstrassian power series 
expansions—to show that Riemann space is composed of Riemann surfaces, 
and therefore of Weierstrassian power series expansions. 2 It is this logic of 
the calculus of problems, modeled on mathematics, that Deleuze redeploys 
in relation to the history of philosophy as a logic of difference in order to 
generate the philosophical problematics that he then uses to construct a 
philosophy of difference. 
 It is important to note that Deleuze eschews characterizing his rede-
ployment of the logic of the calculus of problems as simply analogical or 
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metaphorical. He is careful to distinguish between those mathematical 
notions that are quantitative and exact in nature, which it is “quite wrong” 
to use metaphorically “because they belong to exact science” (Deleuze 
1995, 29), and those mathematical problems that are “essentially inexact 
yet completely rigorous” (Deleuze 1995, 29) and that have led to important 
developments not only in mathematics and science in general, but also in 
other nonscientifi c areas such as philosophy and the arts. Deleuze argues 
that this sort of notion is “not unspecifi c because something’s missing but 
because of its nature and content” (Deleuze 1995, 29). An example of an 
inexact and yet rigorous notion is Henri Poincaré’s qualitative theory of dif-
ferential equations, which develops the concept of an essential singularity. 
The different kinds of essential singularity are observed by virtue of the tra-
jectories of variables across a potential function, rather than because there 
is a specifi c mathematical proof of their existence. Another example, is a 
Riemann space, which Deleuze describes as occurring “when the connecting 
of parts is not predetermined but can take place in many ways: it is a space 
which is disconnected, purely optical, sound or even tactile (in the style of 
Bresson)” (Deleuze 1989, 129). While Deleuze recognizes that citing math-
ematical notions of the exact kind outside of their particular sphere would 
rightly expose one to the criticism of “arbitrary metaphor or of forced appli-
cation” (Deleuze 1989, 129), he defends the use he makes of mathematical 
notions of the inexact kind. He does so on the grounds that by “taking 
from scientifi c operators a particular conceptualizable character which itself 
refers to non-scientifi c areas” (Deleuze 1989, 129), the redeployment of 
this conceptualizable character in relation to another nonscientifi c area is 
justifi ed. What this means is that the other nonscientifi c area “converges 
with science without applying it or making it a metaphor” (Deleuze 1989, 
129). A useful way of characterizing the relation between the conceptualiz-
able character of the inexact mathematical notion and this conceptualizable 
character as redeployed in other nonscientifi c areas, insofar as the latter 
converges with the former, is to refer to it as a modeling relation. That is, the 
conceptualizable character as redeployed in a nonscientifi c area is modeled 
on the conceptualizable character of the inexact mathematical notion. What 
distinguishes a modeling relation from a relation of analogy or metaphor is 
that there are “correspondences without resemblance” (Deleuze 1994, 184) 
between them. That is, there is a correspondence between the conceptualiz-
able character in each instance; however, there is no resemblance between 
the scientifi c elements of the mathematical problem and the nonscientifi c 
elements of the discourse in which this conceptualizable character has been 
redeployed. It is this conceptualizable character that is characteristic of the 
two examples above and of all of the mathematical problems, including the 
concept of the differential, that Deleuze deploys in his philosophy as models 
to reconfi gure philosophical problems and to construct alternative lineages 
in the history of philosophy. 
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 While Deleuze does refer to his project as developing a “ mathesis uni-
versalis ”  (Deleuze 1994, 181), he doesn’t consider there to be a defi nite 
system of mathematical laws at the base of nature. Mathematics is not priv-
ileged in this way over other discourses. There is, however, a peculiarity 
about the discourse of mathematics that remains a sticking point in other 
discourses, and that is the nature of the relation between the objects of the 
discourse and the ideas of those objects as expressed within the discourse. 
Mathematics is peculiar because all of its objects are actually constructed 
by the discourse itself. The ideas of the objects of mathematics are there-
fore directly and unproblematically related to the objects themselves. 3 It 
is for this reason that mathematics is fi gured as providing a model for our 
understanding of the nature of this relation in other discourses, where it is 
far from straightforward. Deleuze takes Lautman’s concept of the mathe-
matical real, which includes the sum of all mathematical theories and the 
structure of the problematic ideas that govern them, and casts it as a model 
for our understanding of the nature of the relation between the objects of 
any one discourse and the structure of the problematic ideas that govern 
them within that discourse. Insofar as all discourses can be modeled in this 
way, Deleuze argues that there is a “ mathesis universalis ”  (Deleuze 1994, 
181). Deleuze is not positing a positive mathematical order to the universe, 
but he is rather nominating the Lautmanian mathematical real as a model 
for our understanding of the structure of all other discourses. 
 It is important to note that Lautman’s references to a dialectic of ideas 
should therefore not be understood as being references to a general dialectic 
that exists independently of the mathematics. Lautman is quite explicit in 
claiming that the dialectic of ideas is the fourth point of view of the mathe-
matical real (Lautman 2011, 183). The mathematical real is not just the sum 
of all mathematical theories. The former should therefore not be collapsed 
into the latter. To do so would lead to the mistaken thesis that mathematics 
provides evidence of an external and more general dialectic that is equally 
accessible by means of some kind of analysis performed in regard to or 
from within other discourses. What seems to be clear in Lautman’s work 
is that he considers himself to be working within the constraints of the dis-
course of mathematics, and the structure of the dialectic that he presents is 
determined as operating within the expanded concept of mathematics that 
he makes claim to: the mathematical real. The dialectic of ideas is indepen-
dent of the mathematical theories, or the mathematics per se, but not of the 
expanded understanding of the mathematical real. 
 Lautman does claim that the structure of the dialectic is not the sole privy 
of the mathematical real, and that it can therefore also “be found” in other 
discourses. However, he does not claim that this is the case because the dia-
lectic is able to be generalized, or insofar as it is transcendent with respect to 
the mathematical real. While Lautman makes strong claims to the unity of 
mathematics, which was controversial at the time and remains so today, he 
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does not make any claim whatsoever as to the unity of all discourses. What 
Lautman argues rather is that this is the case because the way that the struc-
ture of the dialectic operates in the mathematical real functions as a model 
for recognizing how it can be understood to operate in other discourses. 
 Lautman maintains that we are able to recognize the logic of relations 
structured by the dialectic in other discourses solely by virtue of the math-
ematical theories in which these relations are incarnated—as Lautman 
argues, “the effectuation of these connections is immediately mathematical 
theory” (Lautman 2011, 28). That is to say that it is the way in which the 
mathematical logic is deployed in other discourses that allows such a dis-
course to be understood to operate according to the dialectic. By dialectic 
Lautman means here the dialectic of the mathematical real. So mathematics 
is not privileged over other discourses according to Lautman because, on the 
one hand, he doesn’t consider there to be a defi nite system of mathematical 
laws at the base of nature, and, on the other hand, he does consider it to 
be intimately involved in our understanding of the very dialectical structure 
of those discourses. What this amounts to is that mathematical theories are 
not the sole privy of mathematics, or the mathematical real; they also pro-
vide the ground for understanding how the dialectic operates in other dis-
courses. So when Lautman argues that “mathematical logic does not enjoy 
in this respect any special privilege. It is only one theory among others and 
the problems that it raises or that it solves are found almost identically 
elsewhere” (Lautman 2011, 28), by privileged, we should also understand 
exclusive to the mathematical real. 
 What is important about mathematics, for Lautman, Deleuze, and 
Badiou, is its  a priority ,  which allows the dialectic of ideas to be recog-
nized as a component of the mathematical real in a way that is not directly 
accessible in other discourses. This sets up the mathematical real, and the 
structure of the dialectic as it operates in the mathematical real, as a model 
for the structure of other discourses, and for how we can understand these 
other discourses to operate. It is the conceptual character of mathematical 
theories or problems that, when deployed in relation to other discourses, 
allows such a discourse to be understood to operate according to the dia-
lectic, or to be structured by the dialectic. It is by tracing the history of the 
conceptual character of the differential as deployed in a number of devel-
opments in mathematics, and the deployment of the conceptual character 
of these developments in mathematics in relation to specifi c problems in the 
history of philosophy, that the structure of the dialectic of the mathematical 
real is developed as an important component of the structure of Deleuze’s 
philosophy. 
 Deleuze is not alone in being infl uenced by the work of Lautman. In 
 Being and Event , Badiou openly declares that what he owes to Lautman’s 
writings, “even in the very foundational intuitions for this book, is immea-
surable” (Badiou 2005, 482). Indeed, Badiou’s thesis that “ontology is math-
ematics” (Badiou 2005, 13), which is developed in relation to axiomatic set 
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theory, and Cohen’s extensions of it, is a formalization of the structure of 
the dialectic of ideas. It is therefore not a response to the dialectic of ideas, 
but a formal restatement of its structure within the mathematical real. Axi-
omatic set theory, as qualifi ed above, operates as the mathematical theory 
that provides the ground for understanding how the dialectic operates in 
other discourses, namely the four conditions that Badiou proposes: Science, 
Politics, Art, Love. So for Badiou, an Event, whether characterized in the 
mathematical real or another discourse, is a dialectical Idea, and felicity to 
it operates according to the structure of the dialectic of ideas. 
 What distinguishes Deleuze from Badiou is that Deleuze is not committed 
to such a bold thesis statement as Badiou, so Deleuze’s claims are not depen-
dent on the success of axiomatic set theory to provide foundations for math-
ematics and therefore for all other discourse. Deleuze’s claims are rather 
epistemically modest. While set theory operates as a formal restatement 
of the structure of the dialectic of ideas for Badiou, the mathematics that 
Deleuze draws upon operates as an informal restatement of this structure. 
It is informal since it is dependent upon a collection of intuitive results in 
the work of Poincaré and Riemann, rather than on rigorous formal proofs. 
Rather than claiming that it is  the mathematical model, as Badiou does with 
axiomatic set theory, for Deleuze, it is  a mathematical model that he consid-
ers to be more useful than other potential models that had been proposed. 
 The work of Lautman, Deleuze, and Badiou does more than merely pro-
vide descriptive accounts, using different terms, of an overarching dialectic 
of ideas that subsumes the operations of all discourses. Rather, their respec-
tive works are arguments for a particular kind of dialectic of ideas that can 
be understood to operate in relation to other discourses by virtue of the way 
that it operates in the mathematical real. The detail of the structure of the 
dialectic can only be offered in terms of the mathematical real; however, 
this structure can be used to model the structure and mode of operation 
of other discourses. So the structure of the dialectic of ideas can indeed be 
found in other discourses, as Lautman states; however, it is only by virtue 
of the extent to which the structure of other discourses can be determined 
to operate according to the model of the mathematical real that this can be 
achieved. 
 For Deleuze, the manner by means of which an idea is implicated in the 
mathematical theory that determines it serves as a model for the manner 
by means of which a philosophical concept is implicated in the philosoph-
ical problematic that determines it. There is therefore a correspondence 
between the logic of the calculus of problems and the logic of the theory of 
relations that is characteristic of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, insofar 
as the latter is modeled on the former. There are “correspondences without 
resemblance” (Deleuze 1994, 184) between them, insofar as both are deter-
mined according to the same logic, i.e., according to the logic of differen t/
c iation, but without resemblance between their elements. The philosoph-
ical implications of this convergence, or modeling relation, are developed 
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by Deleuze in  Expressionism in Philosophy (Deleuze 1990) in relation to 
his reading of Spinoza’s theory of relations in the  Ethics (see Duffy 2004; 
2006),  and in  Bergsonism (Deleuze 1988), and  Cinema 1 and  2 (Deleuze 
1986; 1989) in relation to his understanding of Bergson’s intention “to give 
multiplicities the metaphysics which their scientifi c treatment demands” 
(Deleuze 1991, 117). 
 PRICE AND SUBJECT NATURALIST PRAGMATISM 
 So the claim I am making in this chapter is that Deleuze does have a model 
that fi ts with the speculative side of Humean speculative M-Naturalism. 
However, there are real problems fi tting Deleuze into the Methodological-
Naturalist side of speculative M-Naturalism. The main diffi culty turns on 
the foundational role of certain “semantic” or “representationalist” presup-
positions in this form of naturalism. 
 Naturalism has two registers, both ontological and epistemological. “As 
an ontological doctrine, it is the view that in some important sense, all there 
 is is the world studied by science. As an epistemological doctrine, it is the 
view that all genuine knowledge is scientifi c knowledge” (Price 2011, 185). 
According to Price, these views constitute what he refers to as “ object nat-
uralism ” (Price 2011, 185), and Leiter’s M-Naturalism represents a subset 
of the latter epistemological doctrine of object naturalism. Despite being 
widely endorsed in contemporary philosophy, there are a number of both 
supporters and critics who consider object naturalism to lead to some seri-
ous diffi culties. One of the implications is that, “in so far as philosophy is 
concerned with the nature of objects and properties of various kinds, its 
concern is with something in the natural world” (Price 2011, 186). In spite 
of the fact that “there are very different ways of talking about the world-
as-studied-by-science”—for example, as “different “modes of presentation” 
of aspects of the same natural reality, . . . the object of each kind of talk is 
an aspect of the world-as-studied-by-science. . . . The diffi culties stem from 
the fact that in many interesting cases it is hard to see what natural facts 
we could be talking about” (Price 2011, 186). A range of candidates is 
generally offered, including “meaning, value, mathematical truth, causation 
and physical modality, and various aspects of mentality” (Price 2011, 186). 
Regardless of which side of the issue one stands on, i.e., whether you are a 
naturalist or an opponent of naturalism, there is a shared conviction in most 
of contemporary philosophy that “the list is non-empty” (Price 2011, 186). 
Price refers to these diffi culties as “ placement problems ” (Price 2011, 186) 
and considers them to “stem from a presupposition about the ontological 
scope of science—roughly, the naturalist assumption that all there is is the 
world as studied by science” (Macarthur and Price 2007, 94). The diffi culty 
with this kind of ontological assumption is that the question of how “moral 
facts, mathematical facts, and meaning facts” (Price 2011, 187) are to be 
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“placed” becomes pertinent. How are topics of these kinds to be located 
within a naturalistic framework, thus conceived? Either these topics are 
forced “into a category which for one reason or another seems ill-shaped to 
contain it,” or, they are to be regarded “as at best second-rate,” i.e., not as 
genuine areas of fact or knowledge (Price 2011, 187). 
 One option in response to this dilemma could be to reject naturalism, 
i.e., to be non-naturalistic in the same ontological or epistemic registers. 
The argument in support of this view being that “[i]f genuine knowledge 
need not be scientifi c knowledge, genuine facts not scientifi c facts, there is 
no need to try to squeeze the problem cases into naturalistic clothing” (Price 
2011, 187). In this way, placement problems, as Price calls them, “provide 
the motivation for much contemporary opposition to naturalism in philoso-
phy” (Price 2011, 187). The other option in response to this dilemma, which 
is endorsed by Price, is “to reject the naturalism that produces it” (Price 
2011, 187), i.e., to be a different kind of naturalist. The idea being that one 
can “reject  object naturalism, in favor of a subject naturalist approach to 
the same theoretical problems” (Price 2011, 187). 
 One way of thinking about the distinction between object naturalism and 
subject naturalism is to understand that according to the latter, “philoso-
phy needs to begin with what science tells us  about ourselves. Science tells 
us that we humans are natural creatures, and if the claims and ambitions 
of philosophy confl ict with this view, then philosophy needs to give way” 
(Price 2011, 186). On this view, subject naturalism is no more than an obvi-
ous corollary of object naturalism, and contemporary “naturalists,” whom 
Price refers to as object naturalists, would have no problem with also claim-
ing that they are subject naturalists. This is also the kind of naturalism that 
Leiter proposes in referring to both Humean and Nietzschean naturalism as 
speculative M-Naturalism—the speculative component is secondary to the 
object naturalism that underpins it. 
 What Price wants to do, and this is what is interesting about Price’s posi-
tion, is to reverse the presumed priority of object naturalism over subject 
naturalism. According to Price, “Subject naturalism comes fi rst, in a very 
important sense” (Price 2011, 186). Price proposes two theses. First, a “Pri-
ority Thesis,” which states that: “Subject naturalism is theoretically prior 
to object naturalism, because the latter depends on validation from a sub-
ject naturalist perspective” (Price 2011, 186). And, second, an “Invalidity 
Thesis,” which states that: “There are strong reasons for doubting whether 
object naturalism deserves to be ‘validated’—whether its presuppositions do 
survive subject naturalist scrutiny” (Price 2011, 187). Price’s argument for 
this claim depends on “the role of certain ‘semantic’ or ‘representationalist’ 
presuppositions in the foundations of object naturalism” (Price 2011, 184). 
In order “to avoid a universal subjectivism,” a problem that non-naturalist 
positions are left to deal with, the subject naturalist approach to the place-
ment problems presented by Price relies on the fact that “these problems 
 originate as problems about human linguistic usage” (Price 2011, 187). This 
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is what distinguishes object naturalism from subject naturalism. With the 
former, placement problems begin with the objects themselves, whereas with 
the latter, placement problems begin with “linguistic (or perhaps psycholog-
ical) data” (Price 2011, 187). So for the subject naturalist, the “placement 
problems are initially problems about human linguistic behavior (or perhaps 
about human thought)” (Price 2011, 189), whereas object naturalism “turns 
such a concern into an issue about something else—about value, mathemat-
ical reality, causation, or whatever” (Price 2011, 189). Attention is shifted 
away from the  term ,  to what it is  about . The shift relies on what Price calls 
“the  representationalist assumption” (Price 2011, 189), which is the assump-
tion “that the  linguistic items in question ‘stand for’ or ‘represent’ something 
 non-linguistic ” (Price 2011, 189). 4 It is this assumption that grounds the 
shift in focus for the object naturalist “from the  term ‘X’ or  concept X ,  to 
its assumed  object ,  X” (Price 2011, 189). The object naturalist’s mistake is 
precisely to follow this representationalist path, into what Price refers to 
as “the  cul de sac of metaphysics” (Macarthur and Price 2007, 97), i.e., by 
asking metaphysical questions that attempt to raise the question of what is 
being spoken  about . Object naturalism is based upon the kind of theoretical 
framework that is derived from such a representational view of language. 
Price argues that “[t]he object naturalist’s instinct is always to appeal to the 
representational character of language to bring the issue back to the mate-
rial level” (Price 2011, 198), whereas, on the contrary, subject naturalism 
“remains in the linguistic realm,” dealing with what Price refers to as the 
“puzzle about a plurality of  ways of talking, of forms of human linguistic 
behavior” (Price 2011, 199). The challenge for the subject naturalist, as Price 
sees it, “is to explain in naturalistic terms how creatures like us come to talk 
in these various ways. This is a matter of explaining what role the different 
language games play in our lives—what differences there are between the 
functions of talk of value and the functions of talk of” things (Price 2011, 
199). The “guiding intuition” of Price’s subject naturalism “is that if we 
can explain how natural creatures in our circumstances naturally come to 
speak in these ways, there is no further puzzle about the place of the topics 
concerned, in the kind of world described by science” (Macarthur and Price 
2007, 95). If this were the case, then placement problems would be resolved. 
 Because of the subject naturalist alternative proposed by Price, it is clear 
that the placement problems that object naturalism is faced with are not 
problems for naturalism  per se . Subject naturalism does not challenge the 
view that in some respects, philosophy should properly defer to science. 
Indeed Macarthur and Price argue that subject naturalist pragmatists are 
“happy to stand with the folk,” i.e., with ordinary, nontechnical natural 
language vocabulary: 
 and to affi rm the fi rst-order truths of the domains in question—to affi rm 
that there are beliefs, and values, and causes, and ways things might 
have been, and so on. What they reject is any distinctively metaphysical 
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theoretical perspective from which to say more about these matters—
that they do or don’t  really exist [realism versus fi ctionalism], that they 
are  really something subjective [subjectivism], or whatever. (Macarthur 
and Price 2007, 100) 
 Pragmatism in Price’s sense is thus a “no metaphysics” view rather than 
an antirealist view. Subject naturalist pragmatists, in addition to being rep-
resentational quietists, are metaphysical  quietists , i.e., not antirealist, but 
quietist on realism, where “quietism about a particular vocabulary amounts 
to a rejection of that vocabulary, for the purposes of philosophical theory” 
(Macarthur and Price 2007, 116). Macarthur and Price offer the following 
theological example of quietism: 
 a theological quietist is not merely agnostic about the issues that divide 
theists from atheists. She rejects theological discourse altogether, at least 
as a vocabulary for theoretical investigation. She may reject it for all 
purposes, simply declining to play that language game at all; or she may 
regard it as playable with some other point. In the latter case, her atti-
tude is analogous to that of a typical semantic defl ationist, who doesn’t 
want to abandon the truth predicate altogether, but merely to insist that 
it has no independent role to play in marking a legitimate topic of theo-
retical investigation. (Macarthur and Price 2007, 116) 
 An example of the kind of language game that Macarthur and Price have in 
mind involves assertoric language, which, they argue, seems to facilitate and 
encourage the tendency toward conformity across our communities. Within 
the assertion game, Macarthur and Price argue that 
 we give voice to our psychological dispositions in ways which invite 
challenges by speakers with contrary dispositions. (“That’s false” and 
“That’s true” are markers of challenge and concession, respectively . . . ). 
 As ordinary speakers, of course, we don’t understand that this is 
what assertoric language is for—we just do it, as it were, and from our 
point of view, seem to be “saying how things are.” But the function 
of this practice of “saying how things are” is . . . [that] of altering our 
behaviourally signifi cant commitments much more rapidly than our 
individual experience in the environment could do, by giving us access 
to the corresponding states of our fellows (and much else besides). 
 The suggestion is thus that “representational” language is a tool for 
aligning commitments across a speech community. But though in this 
sense a single tool, it is a tool with many distinct applications, cor-
responding to the distinct primary functions of the various kinds of 
psychological states that take advantage of it—that facilitate their own 
alignment by expressing themselves in assertoric form. (Macarthur and 
Price 2007, 114) 
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 It is arguably these sorts of language games, backed by a defl ationary meta-
physics rather than simply an antimetaphysical ironism, that Deleuze can be 
understood to be engaging in with the range of vocabularies that he devel-
ops across his different works, and in his work with Guattari. 
 DELEUZE AS A SPECULATIVE SUBJECT 
NATURALIST PRAGMATIST 
 In  Difference and Repetition , Deleuze offers a critique of the presumption of 
a connection between an idea and something that it represents. For Deleuze, 
the “idea” is not bound to the representation of an object or a concept, 
nor is it the property of individual consciousness. Difference, in Deleuze’s 
sense of the term, is also not tied to representation, thus it does not involve 
a comparison of one thing or concept to another. Deleuze insists that 
“[d]ifference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to 
the requirements of representation” (Deleuze 1994, 262). 
 One aspect of the way that mathematics models the logic of the calculus 
of problems for Deleuze is that the mathematics that he draws upon to 
develop this model also actually models the nature of the illusory relation 
of representation between an idea and that which it represents in discourses 
other than mathematics. Deleuze draws upon the work of Salomon Mai-
mon on mathematics to develop this aspect of his critique of representa-
tion. According to Maimon, the operation of integration functions as a 
mathematical rule of the understanding that is applied to the elements of 
sensation, which are modeled on differentials, in order to bring the man-
ifolds of sensation to consciousness as sensible objects of intuition. What 
appear to us as external objects are therefore constructed as such by the 
understanding, and the retrospective explanation of the construction is 
that it is the result of the application of a mathematical rule of the under-
standing to the elements of sensation. In the fi rst step of the process, two 
different manifolds of sensation characterized by different differentials are 
brought into consciousness by virtue of the application of integration as a 
rule of the understanding to the elements of sensation or differentials. The 
real relation between the two qualities themselves, as sensible objects, is 
modeled on the real relation between their differentials. A primary physical 
judgment is then made about the products of integration, which determines 
them as sensible objects. What this amounts to is that all physical judg-
ments whatsoever are predicated on a prior mathematical judgment, which 
“escapes consciousness” (Gueroult 1929, 64). It is therefore an illusion that 
sensible or real objects appear as external objects to us, when in fact they 
are the product of our understanding. While Deleuze’s campaign against 
representation looks as though it fi ts the bill as far as pragmatic non-
representationalism is concerned, can the same be said of Deleuze’s meta-
physics of the calculus? 
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 I have argued that the metaphysics of the calculus on which Deleuze 
models his calculus of problems is a defl ationary metaphysics modeled 
on mathematics. I would therefore argue that it is naturalist in the requi-
site way for subject naturalist pragmatism, in so far as it “properly defers 
to science.” However, despite this, it is probably not quietist enough on 
metaphysics for the subject naturalist pragmatist. Indeed, Deleuze’s non-
representationalism is also probably not quietist enough on representation 
for the subject naturalist pragmatist. For this reason, I’d like to propose 
that Deleuze rather be thought of as a speculative subject naturalist prag-
matist. What I mean by this is that Deleuze be thought of as “speculative” 
in the same way that Leiter speaks of Nietzsche and Hume, but without 
Leiter’s commitment to the priority of object naturalism. Not only does this 
approach provide a useful way of thinking about how Deleuze’s philosophy 
can contribute to contemporary philosophical debate, but it also provides a 
perspective from which to develop a critical appraisal of Leiter’s Nietzsche, 
on the presumption that a case can be made that Nietzsche would fi t more 
neatly into the subject naturalist mold rather than that of object naturalism 
in which Leiter attempts to place him. 
 The speculative aspect of what I’m referring to as Deleuze’s speculative 
subject naturalist pragmatism can be regarded as Deleuze’s commitment to 
attempt to give an account of what determines or conditions the “psycho-
logical states” or “dispositions” that make up the basic units of Macarthur 
and Price’s subject naturalist pragmatism—when they talk about the asser-
tion game as facilitating the alignment of our own psychological states with 
the “corresponding states of our fellows (and much else besides)” (Macar-
thur and Price 2007, 114). It may well be that Macarthur and Price consider 
such issues and the speculative efforts to account for them to be either too 
ontological and/or more anthropological, and therefore to lie outside of phi-
losophy  per se as conceived by subject naturalist pragmatism. 
 Characterizing Deleuze’s work as being speculative subject naturalist 
pragmatism would on this view be something like speculative ontology and/
or an anthropological deployment of subject naturalist pragmatism. I don’t 
necessarily have a problem with either of these characterizations. Indeed the 
former squares well with my own research on Deleuze and mathematics, 
and the latter squares well with the interdisciplinarity that is at the core of 
Deleuze’s project, and is a major research focus in Deleuze studies. 
 Even within the subject naturalist pragmatist fold, there are different 
views about what counts as philosophy for the subject naturalist pragma-
tist. Indeed, Macarthur’s pragmatism differs from that of Price insofar as 
Macarthur questions whether or not some of the investigations in science 5 
that Price undertakes actually count as philosophy on this model. Price con-
cedes that this is no challenge to his kind of pragmatism as such, but only to 
“its right to call itself philosophy” (Macarthur and Price 2007, 119). Such 
concessions are instructive both for Deleuzians and pragmatists. So, even 
though pragmatists may well turn their backs on what I’m calling Deleuze’s 
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speculative subject naturalist pragmatism, this speculative approach, to bor-
row a phrase from Price, is “at least compatible with, if not mandated by, 
the pragmatist doctrine that we understand problematic notions in terms of 
their practical signifi cance” (Price 2010, 231). 
 Whether or not such a defl ationary account of Deleuze’s metaphysics 
would be acceptable to those working in the fi eld of Deleuze studies remains 
an open question; however, the Deleuze presented in this chapter has the 
fl exibility to underpin research in all areas of Deleuze studies regardless of 
the particular interdisciplinary mix. For this reason I look forward to the 
research output that embraces the deployment of such a “sober and more 
mundane” (Lefebvre 2008, xiv) but ultimately more useful Deleuze. 
 NOTES 
 1.  The real risk with Paul Patton’s approach to the relation between Deleuze’s 
work and pragmatism in Patton 2010 (reprinted in this volume), where he 
attributes to Deleuze a Rortyean-style “antimetaphysical ironism” (62), is that 
some important aspects of Deleuze’s thought are underplayed in order to bet-
ter draw connections with pragmatism. For instance, the metaphysics of the 
calculus that Deleuze develops falls out of Patton’s reading in the name of this 
antimetaphysical ironism. The aim of the present paper is to provide a defl a-
tionary account of Deleuze’s metaphysics that functions as a model for the 
range of vocabularies that Deleuze develops across his different works, and in 
his work with Guattari, to supplement Patton’s approach. 
 2.  Deleuze is aware of Weyl’s work on Riemann via Lautman’s commentary on 
Weyl, which Deleuze cites in Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 485. See Lautman 
2011, 133–137 and Duffy 2013, 103–115. The importance of Lautman’s work 
to Deleuze’s engagement with mathematics in Deleuze (1994) is explored in 
Duffy 2013, 117–136. 
 3.  And this is regardless of subsequent questions about the status of those objects 
within the philosophy of mathematics, or even about competing constructions 
in mathematics itself. 
 4.  Price points out that “for present purposes the special case in which the sub-
ject matter is also linguistic” is “left aside” (Price 2011, 189). 
 5.  See for example Price (1996) and Corry and Price (2007). 
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